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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-2534 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
EPOLITO ESTEVEZ-ULLOA, a/k/a Polito Esteves,  
a/k/a Cecar Santiago, a/k/a Vistor R. Martinez, 
                                                                       Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-18-cr-00126-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 16, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Epolito Estevez-Ulloa appeals his sentence for illegal reentry.  Because the 
sentence was substantively reasonable, we will affirm. 
I 
 Estevez-Ulloa is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic.  Around 1991, he 
illegally entered the United States but thereafter obtained lawful permanent resident 
status.  Thereafter, he was arrested and convicted of federal and state drug crimes and 
was deported.  He again illegally reentered the United States, and was again convicted of 
drug offenses.  Instead of being immediately deported, he was charged with unlawful 
reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).  He pleaded guilty.   
As part of sentencing, Estevez-Ulloa submitted a letter stating that he provided 
information about corrupt narcotics officers, which was later shown to be untrue.  The 
Court continued the sentencing hearing to review the letter.  At the next sentencing 
hearing, the Government represented that no evidence supported the letter, and Estevez-
Ulloa’s counsel suggested that the letter may have been the result of psychological 
problems.  The Court again continued the sentencing hearing to allow defense counsel to 
determine whether such psychological problems existed.  At the next sentencing hearing, 
defense counsel stated that Estevez-Ulloa was mentally competent and relayed other 
information, but the Court said that this information did not corroborate the allegations in 
the letter.  The Court ordered an amended presentence report to address a possible 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.   
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The amended report applied a two-level enhancement to Estevez-Ulloa’s offense 
level for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, explaining that the letter 
was false and that Estevez-Ulloa had made contradictory statements about the letter to the 
Probation Office.  Given that enhancement, other adjustments, and his criminal history, 
the report placed his Guidelines range at 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment.  Estevez-Ulloa 
objected to the enhancement at the next sentencing hearing and the Court continued the 
hearing so the Government could respond.  Estevez-Ulloa subsequently withdrew his 
objection.   
At the fifth and final sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted without 
objection the facts and conclusions in the amended presentence report.  The Government 
moved for a downward departure based on matters unrelated to the letter.  The Court 
granted the motion and departed downward two levels, resulting in a Guidelines range of 
57 to 71 months’ imprisonment.   
The District Court sentenced Estevez-Ulloa to 72 months’ imprisonment followed 
by three years’ supervised release.  The 72-month sentence included a one-month upward 
variance, which the Court explained was warranted based on the facts before the Court, 
including the letter.  In explaining its sentence, the Court cited, among other things, 
Estevez-Ulloa’s criminal history since residing in the United States and the fact that he 
only made his living selling drugs.  In imposing a term of supervised release, the Court 
found that the presumption against supervised release for deportable defendants had been 
rebutted based on Estevez-Ulloa’s prior criminal activity and the presence of his wife in 
the United States and that supervised released would deter reentry.    
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Estevez-Ulloa appeals his sentence. 
II 
 Estevez-Ulloa claims that the District Court’s (1) one-month upward variance and 
(2) imposition of a term of supervised release were substantively unreasonable.  We 
review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Miller, 833 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir. 2016).  We will overturn a sentence as substantively 
unreasonable “only where ‘no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.’”  United 
States v. Napolitan, 830 F.3d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 
763 F.3d 322, 335 (3d Cir. 2014)).  We look at the totality of the circumstances, United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), and the record before the 
District Court,  United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). 
A 
 Estevez-Ulloa argues that the one-month upward variance was substantively 
unreasonable because the District Court’s reasons for the variance were already 
encompassed in the determination of his Guidelines range.  At the outset, “we cannot 
presume that a sentence is unreasonable simply because it falls outside the advisory 
Guidelines range.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.  Moreover, “a sentencing court is not 
prohibited from considering the factual basis underlying a defendant’s sentence 
enhancements, and indeed, should consider those facts in order to tailor the sentence to 
the defendant’s individual circumstances.”  United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 103 
(3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 708 
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(3d Cir. 2011).  Indeed, a sentencing court may consider conduct that also supports an 
obstruction enhancement when applying the § 3553(a) factors and “fixing a sentence.”  
Greenidge, 495 F.3d at 102-03. 
 Here, the District Court explained that a variance was warranted based on the 
record, which includes Estevez-Ulloa’s extensive criminal history, his sole vocation of 
drug dealing, his multiple illegal entries into the United States, and his obstructive 
conduct.  See Lessner, 498 F.3d at 203.  As to this latter point, his letter falsely accused 
several law enforcement officers of wrongdoing.  Not only were the accusations false, but 
Estevez-Ulloa’s motivation for his accusations against the agents was based on their 
failure to fulfill a purported promise that he could remain in the United States despite his 
unlawful status.  Moreover, Estevez-Ulloa provided shifting explanations about the letter.  
He first told Probation that he wrote the letter himself in Spanish and that another inmate 
typed it in English, but he later stated that he told an inmate what he wanted to say and 
that inmate relayed the information to another inmate who typed the letter.  Furthermore, 
the submission of the letter caused the Government to waste resources to investigate its 
contents, caused his counsel to probe unnecessarily Estevez-Ulloa’s psychological 
fitness, and caused the Court to convene five separate sentencing proceedings.  A 
reasonable sentencing court could easily conclude that the impact of the letter and 
Estevez-Ulloa’s statements about it, together with his repeated drug-dealing while 
illegally in the United States, warranted additional punishment. 
B 
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 Estevez-Ulloa’s argument that imposing supervised release was substantively 
unreasonable also fails.  “Deportable immigrants are presumptively exempt from the 
discretionary imposition of supervised release . . . . ”  United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 
865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c)).  Nonetheless, a court may 
impose supervised release if “the court determines it would provide an added measure of 
deterrence and protection based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case.”  
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5.  In Azcona-Polanco, we noted that we would affirm a term of 
supervised release imposed upon a deportable defendant as substantively reasonable 
given, among other facts, the defendant’s “serious criminal history,” “that after being 
deported he illegally reentered the United States,” and that he “assumed an alias to 
remain in the United States illegally.”  865 F.3d at 154-55 & n.3.  Those same facts are 
present here.  Estevez-Ulloa entered the United States twice without authorization, used 
aliases, and dealt drugs while in the United States.  Given those facts, and the fact that his 
wife resides in the United States, a reasonable sentencing court would conclude that an 
additional deterrent in the form of supervised release was warranted.     
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Estevez-Ulloa’s sentence. 
